Compare Richmond/Marin Cancer rates to Denver:

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DON’T WAIT – GET YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD TO FILE THEIR OWN CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT! (just google: “class action law firm”)

Here is how many cancer cases exist in the Richmond & Marin adjacency:

RICHMOND & MARIN CANCER INCIDENTS

RICHMOND & MARIN CANCER INCIDENTS

And here is the current cancer incidents in Denver, CO. Notice anything interesting?

DENVER CANCER INCIDENTS

DENVER CANCER INCIDENTS

Data sets and images per AMA, American Cancer Society, UC Berkeley, Stanford Medical Center

DON’T WAIT – GET YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD TO FILE THEIR OWN CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT!

Check the Facts yourself, Here:

Check the Facts yourself, Here:

MARIN COUNTY AND RICHMOND CANCER TOXIC POISONING

http://sdrv.ms/13ixsoG

A Service of The Bay Area Medical Research Group

Chevron gave Marin County the highest breast cancer rate in America! It is now proven!

Chevron gave Marin County the highest breast cancer rate in America!

Look at the scientific data on this site. It proves it.

Hire your own uncompromisable testing service, they will re-confirm it.

Look at the facts:

The underground toxin plume could only have been generated by Chevron.

The underground toxin plume does exist, without question.

The chemicals in the underground plume ALWAYS cause cancer.

Chevron has known it was producing and increasing the plume for over 20 years.

The bay water does flow in a complex pattern moving material FROM Richmond to MARIN.

Over 500, or more, peer reviewed studies now prove this.

The air particulates from Chevron ARE cancer causing!

Diagram of 1/3 of the ways they kill you:

Thanks to the Mercury News. This is only a third of the ways they poison you:

Chevron Kills

Chevron Kills

Chevron now voted largest provider of bribes in the World!

Public disclosure documents and investigations on multiple continents now show Chevron to have spent more money bribing policy officials and media than any other company in history.

Chevron has paid over 40 million dollars to Bay Area radio, tv and newspaper companies in order to buy positive news coverage. They commit to an annual budget for advertising and warn the outlets that they will pull the budgets if they see any bad press. They also pay news directors cash under the table.

Chevron has been buying golf junkets for at least two air district members as well as providing them with dinners campaign funding and job offers after they leave the air district.

 

 

The impending failure of big oil overseas has caused Chevron, & others, to put the least $$ possible into community safety & toxin mitigation in domestic neighborhoods!

The impending failure of big oil overseas has caused Chevron, & others, to put the least $$ possible into community safety & toxin mitigation in domestic neighborhoods!

When the Iran War goes off, Venezuala, who has Iranian training camps in their country, will cut of the US oil along with Iran & Iraq. AT that point, Chevron will care nothing about community residents.

Big Oil’s Scorecard in Iraq
How an American disaster paved the way for Big Oil’s rise—and possible fall—in Iraq.

By Greg Muttitt | Thu Aug. 23, 2012 12:53 PM PDT

This story [1] first appeared on the TomDispatch [2] website.

In 2011, after nearly nine years of war and occupation, US troops finally left Iraq. In their place, Big Oil is now present in force and the country’s oil output, crippled for decades, is growing again. Iraq recently reclaimed [3] the number two position in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), overtaking oil-sanctioned Iran. Now, there’s talk of a new world petroleum glut. So is this finally mission accomplished?

Well, not exactly. In fact, any oil company victory in Iraq is likely to prove as temporary as George W. Bush’s triumph in 2003. The main reason is yet another of those stories the mainstream media didn’t quite find room for: the role of Iraqi civil society. But before telling that story, let’s look at what’s happening to Iraqi oil today, and how we got from the “no blood for oil” global protests of 2003 to the present moment.

[4]

Here, as a start, is a little scorecard of what’s gone on in Iraq since Big Oil arrived two and a half years ago: corruption’s [5] skyrocketed; two Western oil companies are being investigated for either giving [6] or receiving [7] bribes; the Iraqi government is paying [8] oil companies a per-barrel fee according to wildly unrealistic production targets they’ve set, whether or not they deliver that number of barrels; contractors are heavily over-charging [9] for drilling wells, which the companies don’t mind since the Iraqi government picks up the tab.

Meanwhile, to protect the oil giants from dissent and protest, trade union offices have been raided [10], computers seized and equipment smashed, leaders arrested and prosecuted [11]. And that’s just in the oil-rich southern part of the country.

In Kurdistan in the north, the regional government awards contracts [12] on land outside its jurisdiction, contracts [13] which permit the government to transfer its stake in the oil projects—up to 25%—to private companies of its choice. Fuel is smuggled [14] across the border to the tune of hundreds of tankers a day.

In Kurdistan, at least the approach is deliberate: the two ruling families of the region, the Barzanis and Talabanis, know that they can do whatever they like, since their Peshmerga militia control the territory. In contrast, the Iraqi federal government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has little control over anything. As a result, in the rest of the country the oil industry operates, gold-rush-style, in an almost complete absence of oversight or regulation.

Oil companies differ as to which of these two Iraqs they prefer to operate in. BP and Shell have opted to rush for black gold in the super-giant oilfields of southern Iraq. Exxon [15] has hedged its bets by investing in both options. This summer, Chevron [16] and the French oil company Total [17] voted for the Kurdish approach, trading smaller oil fields for better terms and a bit more stability.

Keep in mind that the incapacity of the Iraqi government is hardly limited to the oil business: stagnation hangs over its every institution. Iraqis still have an average of just five hours of electricity [18] a day, which in 130-degree heat causes tempers to boil over regularly. The country’s two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, which watered the cradle of civilization 5,000 years ago, are drying up [19]. This is largely due to the inability of the government to engage in effective regional diplomacy that would control upstream dam-building by Turkey.

After elections in 2010, the country’s leading politicians couldn’t even agree on how to form a government until the Iraqi Supreme Court forced them to [20]. This record of haplessness, along with rampant corruption, significant repression, and a revival of sectarianism can all be traced back to American decisions in the occupation years. Tragically, these persistent ills have manifested themselves in a recent spate of car-bombings and other bloody attacks.

Washington’s Yen for Oil

In the period before and around the invasion, the Bush administration barely mentioned Iraqi oil, describing it reverently only as that country’s “patrimony.” As for the reasons for war, the administration insisted that it had barely noticed Iraq had one-tenth of the world’s oil reserves. But my new book reveals documents [21] I received, marked SECRET/NOFORN, that laid out for the first time pre-war oil plans hatched in the Pentagon by arch-neoconservative Douglas Feith’s Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG).

[22]In November 2002, four months before the invasion, that planning group came up with a novel idea: it proposed that any American occupation authority not repair war damage to the country’s oil infrastructure, as doing so “could discourage private sector involvement.” In other words, it suggested that the landscape should be cleared of Iraq’s homegrown oil industry to make room for Big Oil.

When the administration worried that this might disrupt oil markets, EIPG came up with a new strategy under which initial repairs would be carried out by KBR, a subsidiary of Halliburton. Long-term contracts with multinational companies, awarded by the US occupation authority, would follow. International law notwithstanding, the EIPG documents noted cheerily that such an approach would put “long-term downward pressure on [the oil] price” and force “questions about Iraq’s future relations with OPEC.”

At the same time, the Pentagon planning group recommended that Washington state that its policy was “not to prejudice Iraq’s future decisions regarding its oil development policies.” Here, in writing, was the approach adopted in the years to come by the Bush administration and the occupation authorities: lie to the public while secretly planning to hand Iraq over to Big Oil.

There turned out, however, to be a small kink in the plan: the oil companies declined the American-awarded contracts, fearing that they would not stand up in international courts and so prove illegitimate. They wanted Iraq first to have an elected permanent government that would arrive at the same results. The question then became how to get the required results with the Iraqis nominally in charge. The answer: install a friendly government and destroy the Iraqi oil industry.

In July 2003, the US occupation established the Iraqi Governing Council, a quasi-governmental body led by friendly Iraqi exiles who had been out of the country for the previous few decades. They would be housed in an area of Baghdad isolated from the Iraqi population by concrete blast walls and machine gun towers, and dubbed the Green Zone. There, the politicians would feast, oblivious to and unconcerned with the suffering of the rest of the population.

The first post-invasion Oil Minister was Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum, a man who held the country’s homegrown oil expertise in open contempt. He quickly set about sacking the technicians and managers who had built the industry following nationalization in the 1970s and had kept it running through wars and sanctions. He replaced them with friends and fellow party members. One typical replacement was a former pizza chef.

The resulting damage to the oil industry exceeded anything caused by missiles and tanks. As a result the country found itself—as Washington had hoped—dependent on the expertise of foreign companies. Meanwhile, not only did the Coalition Provisional authority (CPA) that oversaw the occupation lose $6.6 billion of Iraqi money, it effectively suggested corruption wasn’t something to worry about. A December 2003 CPA policy document [23] recommended that Iraq follow the lead of Azerbaijan, where the government had attracted oil multinationals despite an atmosphere of staggering corruption (“less attractive governance”) simply by offering highly profitable deals.

Now, so many years later, the corruption is all-pervasive and the multinationals continue to operate without oversight, since the country’s ministry is run by the equivalent of pizza chefs.

The first permanent government was formed under Prime Minister Maliki in May 2006. In the preceding months, the American and British governments made sure the candidates for prime minister knew what their first priority had to be: to pass a law legalizing the return of the foreign multinationals—tossed out of the country in the 1970s—to run the oil sector.

The law was drafted within weeks, dutifully shown to US officials within days, and to oil multinationals [24] not long after. Members of the Iraqi parliament, however, had to wait seven months to see the text.

How Temporary the Victory of Big Oil?

The trouble was: getting it through that parliament proved far more difficult than Washington or its officials in Iraq had anticipated. In January 2007, an impatient President Bush announced a “surge” of 30,000 US troops into the country, by then wracked by a bloody civil war. Compliant journalists accepted the story of a gamble [25] by General David Petraeus to bring peace to warring Iraqis.

In fact, those troops spearheaded a strategy [26] with rather less altruistic objectives: first, broker a new political deal [27] among US allies, who were the most sectarian and corrupt of Iraq’s politicians (hence, with the irony characteristic of American foreign policy, regularly described as “moderates”); second, pressure [28] them to deliver on political objectives set in Washington and known as “benchmarks”—of which passing the oil law was the only one ever really talked about: in President Bush’s biweekly video conferences [29] with Maliki, in almost daily meetings of the US ambassador in Baghdad, and in frequent visits by senior administration officials.

On this issue, the Democrats, by then increasingly against the Iraq War but still pro-Big Oil, lent a helping hand to a Republican administration. Having failed to end the war, the newly Democrat-controlled Congress passed an appropriations bill [30] that would cut off reconstruction funds to Iraq if the oil law weren’t passed. Generals warned [31] that without an oil law Prime Minister Maliki would lose their support, which he knew well [32] would mean losing his job. And to ramp up the pressure further, the US set a deadline of September 2007 to pass the law or face the consequences.

It was then that things started going really wrong for Bush and company. In December 2006, I was at a meeting [33] where leaders of Iraq’s trade unions decided to fight the oil law. One of them summed up the general sentiment this way: “We do not need thieves to take us back to the middle ages.” So they began organizing. They printed pamphlets, held public meetings [34] and conferences, staged protests [35], and watched support for their movement grow.

Most Iraqis feel strongly that the country’s oil reserves belong in the public sector, to be developed to benefit them, not foreign energy companies. And so word spread fast—and with it, popular anger. Iraq’s oil professionals [36] and various civil society groups denounced the law. Preachers railed against it in Friday sermons. Demonstrations were held in Baghdad and elsewhere, and as Washington ratcheted up the pressure, members of the Iraqi parliament started to see political opportunity in aligning themselves with this ever more popular cause. Even some US allies in Parliament confided in diplomats at the American embassy that it would be political suicide to vote for the law.

By the September deadline, a majority of the parliament was against the law and—a remarkable victory for the trade unions—it was not passed. It’s still not passed today.

Given the political capital the Bush administration had invested in the passage of the oil law, its failure offered Iraqis a glimpse of the limits of US power, and from that moment on, Washington’s influence began to wane.

Things changed again in 2009 when the Maliki government, eager for oil revenues, began awarding contracts to them even without an oil law in place. As a result, however, the victory of Big Oil is likely to be a temporary one: the present contracts are illegal, and so they will last only as long as there’s a government in Baghdad that supports them.

This helps explain why the government’s repression of trade unions increased [37] once the contracts were signed. Now, Iraq is showing signs of a more general return to authoritarianism [38] (as well as internecine violence [39] and possibly renewed sectarian conflict).

But there is another possibility for Iraq. Years before the Arab Spring, I saw what Iraqi civil society can achieve by organizing: it stopped the world’s superpower from reaching its main objective and steered Iraq onto a more positive course.

Many times since 2003 Iraqis have moved their country in a more democratic direction: establishing trade unions in that year, building Shi’a-Sunni connections in 2004, promoting anti-sectarian politicians in 2007 and 2008, and voting for them in 2009. Sadly, each of these times Washington has pushed it back toward sectarianism, the atmosphere in which its allies thrive. While mainstream commentators now regularly blame the recent escalation of violence on the departure of US troops, it would be more accurate to say that the real reason is they didn’t leave far sooner.

Now, without its troops and bases, much of Washington’s political heft has vanished. Whether Iraq heads in the direction of dictatorship, sectarianism, or democracy remains to be seen, but if Iraqis again start to build a more democratic future, the US will no longer be there to obstruct it. Meanwhile, if a new politics does emerge, Big Oil may discover that, in the end, it was mission unaccomplished.

Greg Muttitt is the author of Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq [22] (New Press), just published, and described by Naomi Klein as “nothing short of a secret history of the war.” Since 2003, he has worked with Iraqi trade unions campaigning against the privatization of Iraq’s oil, most of that time as co-director of the British charity Platform. To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to receive the latest updates from TomDispatch.com here [40].
Source URL: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/08/big-oils-scorecard-iraq

Links:
[1] http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175586/
[2] http://www.tomdispatch.com/
[3] http://www.platts.com/weblog/oilblog/2012/08/13/iraq_overtakes.html
[4] http://www.tomdispatch.com
[5] http://www.zcommunications.org/iraqi-oil-transparency-and-corruption-by-munir-chalabi
[6] http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-business/leighton-sacks-manager-over-iraq-bribes-20120705-21ig0.html
[7] http://www.4-traders.com/ENI-S-P-A-413403/news/Eni-S-p-A-Eni-Says-Milan-Prosecutors-Probe-Possible-Illicit-Iraq-Awards-14260707/
[8] http://www.fuelonthefire.com/?page=blog#1537
[9] http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/31/iraq-rumaila-idUSLDE62U10X20100331
[10] http://www.inthesetimes.com/working/entry/6260/iraqi_electricity_union_offices_raided_under_draconian_anti-union_decr/
[11] http://solidaritycenter.org/files/iraq_tu_bulletin0610.pdf
[12] http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.nl/2012/05/kurdistans-oil-policy-and-iraqs.html
[13] http://www.krg.org/pdf/3_KRG_Model_PSC.pdf
[14] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/world/middleeast/09kurds.html?_r=1
[15] http://www.iraqoilreport.com/business/companies/exxon-pressing-forward-on-krg-qurna-deals-7546/
[16] http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/07/20/Iraq-Chevron-deal-with-Kurds-makes-waves/UPI-69091342808438/
[17] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/total-iraq-idUSWEA840620120731
[18] http://sports.yahoo.com/news/iraq-power-woes-short-circuit-olympics-viewing-231402017–oly.html
[19] http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/talks-dry-up-in-tigris-euphrates-dispute
[20] http://www.smh.com.au/world/mps-ordered-back-to-work-by-iraqs-supreme-court-20101025-170u1.html
[21] http://www.fuelonthefire.com/?page=documents#1597
[22] http://www.amazon.com/dp/1595588051/ref=nosim/?tag=tomdispatch-20
[23] http://carbonweb.org/documents/Bearing_Point_Iraq_oil.pdf
[24] http://energy.gov/articles/secretary-bodman-hosts-iraqi-ministers-oil-and-electricity
[25] http://us.penguingroup.com/nf/Book/BookDisplay/0,,9781594201974,00.html
[26] http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html
[27] http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29mtext.html?pagewanted=all
[28] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6250687.stm
[29] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801846_3.html?nav=emailpage
[30] http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ28/html/PLAW-110publ28.htm
[31] http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/12/world/middleeast/12military.html?pagewanted=print
[32] http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=102×2766027
[33] http://carbonweb.org/showitem.asp?article=223&parent=39
[34] http://carbonweb.org/showitem.asp?article=252&parent=39
[35] http://www.opednews.com/articles/genera_kathlyn__070716_basra_oil_workers_pr.htm
[36] http://www.al-ghad.org/2007/07/22/translation-of-the-statement-of-108-iraqi-oil-experts-to-the-iraqi-parliament/
[37] http://in.reuters.com/article/2009/07/17/iraq-oil-unions-idINLG20279420090717
[38] http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2012/year-2012-issue-3/iraqs-road-back-to-dictatorship/
[39] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19281043
[40] http://tomdispatch.us2.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=6cb39ff0b1f670c349f828c73&id=1e41682ade

Chevron warned by State Dept. over a year ago about “Shamoon” and other energy company viruses; does nothing!

Chevron was warned by the State Dept. and multiple other agencies, over a year ago, about “Shamoon” and other energy company viruses that take over energy companies yet it does does nothing to shut down the refinery!

Per a 60 Minutes TV show, viewed by millions, The Iran War started long ago with both sides “bombing” each other with virus attacks that take over Siemens and other common factory devices and put them into overload crazy robot attack mode. The latest virus that took out an energy company is called “Shamoon” but many, many previous virus attacks have been documented by the media.

Recent refinery fires and toxic releases may have already been the results of such virus incursions and Chevron may be covering them up.

So many Richmond Refinery staff have been physically sickened and morally sickened by Chevron’s 1% extremist “anything for profit” corporate policy that they are coming forward to NRDC and other local community groups to tell their stories.

If Iran puts a virus in the Chevron Refinery, they could take over the sea pipes, valves and fluid systems and order the refinery to open all of its floodgates of cancer causing toxins and harm Richmond and the whole Bay Area even further. Chevron staff have stated that they have no counter-measures in place for this so the State of California must, by law, order Chevron to remove the Refinery if the State is acting in compliance with the public interest.

The State of California is URGENTLY urged to enter the Chevron Refinery, take copies of all of their records and documents and put live 3rd party monitoring in place of each automated or computerized system in the refinery for the safety of the community.

If the State does not take these appropriate actions ASAP, due to the extensive media coverage, today, of “Shamoon” and other viruses, it will be apparent who controls who. It will be apparent that Chevron has comprised the regulatory agencies and the safety of our community.

Chevron’s refinery, Richmond’s peril

By Antonia JuhaszAugust 14, 2012

Stay inside, close your windows and doors, and turn off air conditioning and heating units. Pets and all children in sporting activities should be brought inside, and have duct tape ready should you need to further seal windows and doors.

These are among the “shelter in place” warnings made to Bay Area residents last week in response to a massive fire at theChevron Corp.refinery in Richmond. The fire burned out of control for more than five hours, sending a giant black cloud of toxic chemicals, including sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide, thousands of feet into the air and out across the bay. While automated calls went to more than 18,000 people, some 160,000 residents live in the areas directly affected by the warning. More than 5,700 people have sought medical treatment.

Chevron is the world’s eighth-largest corporation and hands-down the largest in California. The Richmond refinery is also the state’s single largest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, having released 4.5 million metric tons of greenhouse gases in 2010 alone.

Built in 1902, the refinery shows its age. Rather than use its $27 billion in 2011 profits to run the cleanest, safest and most transparent refinery possible, Chevron operates a refinery that is in constant violation of federal and state law and a daily threat to the health and safety of its workers and neighbors.

More than 25,000 people, including those in two public housing projects, live within just three miles of the refinery. Nearly 85% of the residents live below the federal poverty line; the same percentage is listed as “minorities” according to the U.S. Census. Within one mile of or abutting the refinery are businesses, houses, an elementary school and playgrounds.

Since at least April 2009, the refinery has been in noncompliance of the Clean Water Act and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System in every quarter but one. Until July 2010, the refinery had been in “high-priority violation” of Clean Air Act compliance standards, the most serious level of violation noted by the EPA, since at least 2006. Under constant pressure from community organizations, Chevron has been assessed hundreds of thousands of dollars in penalties for repeated Clean Air Act violations — nearly 100 citations in just the last five years, including 23 in 2011 alone.A 2008 study by UC Berkeley and Brown University researchers concluded that the air inside some Richmond homes was more toxic than that outside because of harmful pollutants from the refinery being trapped indoors.

The Contra Costa County Health Services Department lists the residents of Richmond as one of the “most at-risk groups” in the county: They are hospitalized for chronic diseases at significantly higher rates than the county average, including for female reproductive cancers, which are more than double the county rate. Chevron is one of four refineries in Contra Costa County where nearby incidence of breast, ovarian and prostate cancers are the second highest in California, and where nearby residents suffer higher rates of asthma, childhood asthma and asthma-related deaths.

The Aug. 6 fire is the third major disaster at the refinery in 12 years, each caused by an old leaking pipe. In January 2007, an explosion rocked the refinery, leading to a five-alarm fire. A leaking corroded pipe “that should have been detached two decades ago,” according to investigators, was to blame. In 1999, an 18,000-pound plume of sulfur dioxide smoke was released after an explosion caused by a leak in a pipe that was more than 30 years old.

But neither Richmond nor Chevron is alone. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board, an independent federal agency that investigates major incidents at oil refineries, concluded last month that nationwide safety at U.S. refineries has not improved, despite scores of fatalities, over the last decade, and won’t until companies develop better safety systems.

In a 2007 report about BP‘s 2005 Texas City oil refinery disaster, which killed 15 workers, the board warned of a pervasive “complacency toward serious safety risks” across the leading oil companies’ refinery operations. It called on the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to “require these corporations to evaluate the safety impact of mergers, reorganizations, downsizing and budget cuts.”

This year so far, serious oil refinery fires have broken out at a ConocoPhillips refinery in Los Angeles, twice at one BP refinery in Indiana, and in Louisiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Washington and at other locations. Using industry-reported data, the United Steelworkers estimates that at least one fire occurs every week at a U.S. oil refinery. Operating in noncompliance with federal and state regulations, moreover, appears to be all-but-standard operating procedure across the industry.

Oil industry operations are not clean, safe or healthful. But they can certainly be far cleaner, safer, more healthful and more transparent than current industry practice.

Big Oil is the wealthiest industry the world has known. The companies can and must be forced through stricter federal and state regulation, aggressive enforcement and direct community and worker oversight to be held to the highest possible standard, including current law.

Richmond has always been a company town. But in 2006 its residents rebelled, rejecting Chevron’s handpicked political candidates and electing as mayor the Green Party’s Gayle McLaughlin. State and federal officials who serve as the industry’s handmaidens should anticipate an even broader rebellion as the outcome of this latest tragic, yet painfully predictable, oil company disaster.

Antonia Juhasz is the author of several books on the oil industry, including “The Tyranny of Oil.” She is also the editor and lead author of three Alternative Annual Reports on Chevron and the former director of the Chevron Program at San Francisco-based Global Exchange.

Copyright © 2012, Los Angeles Times